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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

BEFORE THE MILITARY PROCUREMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

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Statement of Joan B. Rohlfing
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Before the Military Procurement Subcommittee
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Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. It is my pleasure to address you today as the Director of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).

In recent years, the worldwide proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their missile delivery systems has emerged as one of the most serious dangers confronting the United States. This is a continuing and evolving problem with broad consequences for international security and stability. At least 20 countries — some of them hostile to the United States — already have or may be developing WMD through the acquisition of dual-use technology, indigenous development and production, and/or support from rogue supplier states. Additionally, safety and security of existing nuclear weapons and materials are of increasing concern as economic and social pressures mount in countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus.

The President has made nonproliferation one of this nation's highest priorities. As the preeminent agency in nuclear materials and weapons technology and protection, the Department of Energy, through the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security, is uniquely suited to provide leadership in national and international efforts to reduce nuclear weapons worldwide; secure and prevent the spread of nuclear materials, technology and expertise; roll back nuclear weapons development programs; avoid proliferation surprise; and respond to nonproliferation emergencies. We particularly draw upon 50 years of science and technology expertise resident throughout the DOE National Laboratory complex to help us achieve these goals.

To reduce the international proliferation threat, the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security is focusing its resources and expertise on the following near-term priorities: ① securing nuclear materials, technology and expertise in Russia and the Newly Independent States; ② maintaining effective protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials, technology and expertise in the United States; ③ limiting weapons-usable fissile materials worldwide; ④ ensuring transparent and irreversible reductions of global nuclear stockpiles; ⑤ supporting the completion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996; ⑥ developing and integrating a program for preventing, detecting and responding to nuclear terrorism and smuggling;

⑦ controlling nuclear exports; and ⑧ strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Through the unique scientific, technical, analytical and operational capabilities of the Department and its National Laboratories, we are working to effectively and efficiently accomplish these near-term priorities by marshaling and integrating our resources and nonproliferation activities.

Some of our most important international activities include: conducting the government-to-government and laboratory-to-laboratory programs of cooperation between U.S. nuclear experts and their counterparts at nuclear facilities and institutes in the former Soviet Union to improve the protection, control and accountability of nuclear materials; assisting Russia and the Newly Independent States in establishing and enhancing nuclear material export control systems; developing advanced technologies and systems to detect the indigenous proliferation of WMD, to enable the verification of arms control treaties, and to facilitate the collection of intelligence information in noncooperative environments; conducting critical operations in cooperation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to stabilize and safely store spent nuclear fuel thereby both freezing the North Korean nuclear weapons program and enabling the application of effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; working with the private sector to engage WMD weapons scientists, engineers and technicians in the former Soviet Union in activities which reduce the proliferation threat; and providing technical support of long-term monitoring of Iraqi facilities and other nuclear safeguards and emergency programs of the IAEA. In addition, we are providing unique and in-depth technical, arms-control, intelligence, research and technology expertise as part of the U.S. Government's integrated efforts to conclude negotiations, prepare for entry into force, and implement a CTBT.

The Department's unique technical and analytical capabilities allow us to play a pivotal role in the weapons of mass destruction arenas of the U.S. Intelligence Community. For example, DOE continues to contribute to National Intelligence Estimates and to support the Intelligence Community's Non-Proliferation Center in assessing the activities of emerging nuclear weapons states and terrorist organizations, the activities of states that supply nuclear materials and expertise, and theft and smuggling of nuclear material.

In concert with our international activities, we are responsible for conducting a wide range of domestic activities that support our nonproliferation and national security goals. These activities include: directing a rigorous safeguards and security program for the entire Department of Energy complex, thereby ensuring the demonstrated security of our own nuclear materials, technology and expertise; declassifying millions of DOE documents while protecting critical information that has the potential to facilitate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and maintaining a security investigations and reinvestigations program for both

Federal and contractor employees of the Department. We also provide technical, analytical, policy and implementation support to the efforts of the nation's policy community to deal with nonproliferation issues.

We also ensure the Department has a robust emergency management and response capability for nonproliferation, energy and nuclear emergencies. Through this program, we provide assistance to other government agencies as well as state, tribal and local governments. Over the past year, we have been providing emergency response experts to assist other foreign governments in reviews of their emergency preparedness plans and capabilities. Through the Partnership for Peace, we have been working with the Departments of State and Defense to assist Russia and the Newly Independent States to plan for and manage energy and radiological emergencies. We also have been working with the International Atomic Energy Agency, International Energy Agency and Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to develop procedures and support plans for any radiological emergency.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Over the past year, we have demonstrated leadership and achieved significant accomplishments in each of our near-term priorities:

- ✓ In 1995, our cooperative efforts with Russia and the Newly Independent States in securing nuclear materials, technology and expertise, has protected over 8 tons of direct-use nuclear material with upgrades to 26 facilities' material protection, control and accounting programs. Before the end of 1996, we expect to broaden this effort to over 35 facilities and protect hundreds of tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Additionally, we have begun discussions with the Russian Navy to begin upgrades on their nuclear facilities as well.

- ✓ We have engaged nearly two thousand weapons scientists, engineers and technicians on 219 scientific projects at 77 institutes in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus to prevent a "brain-drain" of these scientists to other countries that would employ them for their own indigenous nuclear weapons programs.

- ✓ Our work in North Korea has effectively stopped their indigenous nuclear weapons development program. We have a team currently in country canning the spent fuel to prevent its reprocessing for use in nuclear weapons. Additionally, we have enabled the IAEA to apply international safeguards on the existing nuclear facilities remaining in North Korea.

- ✓ We are the sole agency responsible for developing technologies to monitor and verify a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In 1995, we demonstrated significant progress in each of the sensor technologies required to support an international monitoring system: seismic monitoring, radionuclide monitoring, hydroacoustic monitoring, on-site inspection, space-based monitoring, and automated data processing. One particular success is our improvement of the capability to more easily distinguish nuclear explosions from earthquakes — a formidable step toward a greater verification capability.

- ✓ In 1994, the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security completed installation of sensors on all Global Positioning Satellites that allow the United States to continuously detect near-earth and atmospheric nuclear explosions and verify treaty compliance worldwide. In 1995 we began developing and deploying the next-generation of sensors to improve our detection capability.

- ✓ We have also completed the first comprehensive assessment of all the chemicals that might be used in a nuclear weapons life-cycle. This positions the United States to develop better techniques to detect an indigenous nuclear weapons program.

- ✓ Our declassification program has also played an instrumental role in furthering U.S. nonproliferation goals, especially in the initiative to achieve a bilateral agreement with Russia for the exchange of classified information to facilitate confirmation of transparent and irreversible nuclear weapons reductions.

- ✓ The Department's safeguards and security functions that were previously spread across the DOE complex are now consolidated within the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security. This achievement is an important step toward creating a responsive and efficient focal point for the Department's nuclear safeguards and security program and providing a national-level technical resource which is capable of fully supporting multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts.

LOOK TO THE FUTURE

With our many achievements, there is much work to be done in our long and short term priority areas. We cannot rest on our laurels and expect the global nuclear danger to reduce on its own. The programs of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security seek to broaden their effects whereever they are able.

In the coming year and a half, the Department will accelerate efforts to provide enhanced materials protection, control and accounting for fissile materials in Russia and the Newly Independent States. We hope to complete all MPC&A improvements in former Soviet Union states outside of Russia by the end of calendar year 1997 (with the majority of work being completed by the end of the fiscal year). In Russia, we intend to expand cooperation to the remaining facilities in the civil nuclear complex while continuing work with facilities related to the nuclear weapon complex. Our efforts with *Gosatomnadzor* (the Russian agency equivalent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission) to design and promote an indigenous MPC&A standards system will ensure that Russian weapons usable material will be protected after the U.S. involvement has been completed. The program as a whole anticipates upgrades at 50 locations in Russia and 13 locations in the Newly Independent States completed by the year 2002.

We are working to improve regional arms control and nonproliferation regimes through programs such as the Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico. At the CMC, we assist political and technical experts from around the world acquire the technology-based tools they need to assess, design, analyze and implement nonproliferation, arms control and other security measures in their own regions. This particularly fosters regional security and lessens the desire for nations to acquire or develop their own weapons of mass destruction. We plan to further expand this effort with states of the Middle East, South Asia, the Koreas, and China.

In 1996, we hope to conclude an Agreement for Cooperation and a Stockpile Data Exchange Agreement with Russia that will allow us to gain insight into warhead dismantlement. These agreements will build confidence between our two nations that our mutual nuclear arms reductions are in fact occurring and irreversible.

These examples show that our activities are truly beneficial. Through our robust and cost-effective programs, we are able to provide leadership in the nonproliferation community, further the nonproliferation goals of the United States, and ensure the national security.

BUDGET REVIEW

The table below summarizes the fiscal year 1997 budget request for the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security from the Energy and Water Development Appropriation as compared with the fiscal year 1996 adjusted appropriation (in thousands).

Appropriation/Activity	FY 96 appropriated	FY96 comparable	FY 97
Program Direction[1]	—	$ 82,809	$ 95,622
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development	$ 216,142	210,718	194,919
Arms Control and Nonproliferation	160,964	145,057	181,244
Intelligence	42,336	30,957	29,185
Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety[2]	30,000	0	0
Nuclear Safeguards and Security	84,395	46,172	47,208
Security Investigations	20,000	20,000	22,000
Emergency Management	23,321	16,866	16,794
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST	*$ 577,158*	*$ 552,579*	*$ 586,972*

The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development budget request for fiscal year 1997 reflects a savings of $15.3 million. This savings in part is a result of our effort to eliminate duplication between agencies and within DOE, improving coordination between sponsoring agencies, streamlining operations and generating a meaningful cost savings.

The Arms Control and Nonproliferation budget request includes a net increase of $36.1 million concentrated in the area of material protection, control and accounting. This increase is due to the rapid pace of expansion of cooperation with Russian facilities and is important to ensure early safeguarding of weapons usable material at their source. We are also expanding our efforts in the Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor (RERTR) and Industrial Partnering Programs. The increase will also allow us to ensure that the canned spent nuclear fuel in North Korea is not used in an indigenous nuclear development program.

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[1]The Fiscal Year 1997 budget request includes a new Program Direction line item as mandated by the Energy and Water Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1996. This new budget line item provides funding for salaries and benefits, travel, support service contractors and other related expenses associated with the overall management and administration of the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security.

[2]The Soviet Designed Reactor Safety program is run by the Office of Nuclear Energy and funding for this program has been included elsewhere in the Other Defense Activities account.

Finally, the increase will provide increased analysis and support to: U.S. nuclear arms control policies in the Middle East, Asia and South Asia, nuclear energy security issues in Asia, South Asia and Europe, and U.S. policies to deal with excess civil plutonium.

The Intelligence budget request reflects a modest reduction from fiscal year 1996 resulting from realized efficiencies. The request will provide for timely, high-impact analysis and reporting on the proliferation implications of selected nuclear weapons states' programs, emerging nuclear proliferants, nuclear suppliers, and global impacts to the U.S. energy security.

The Nuclear Safeguards and Security budget request for fiscal year 1997 includes a net increase of slightly over $1 million. Through a requested increase and reprioritization of funding needs, we intend to increase the Classification and Declassification budget by approximately $2.3 million. This increase seeks to further develop advanced automation technology in support of the Declassification Productivity Initiative program and implement Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information.

Finally, the Emergency Management budget request for fiscal year 1997 is unchanged from the fiscal year 1996 appropriation. The change reflected in the summary table above is exclusively a result of consolidation of Program Direction funds.

CONCLUSION

Preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction is a crucial aspect of our national interest, and the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security is uniquely capable to serve this national interest, especially through the efforts of our national laboratories. Our science and technology base enables us to provide unique solutions to national and international nonproliferation problems. The work we do benefits the nation's security across a broad spectrum: protecting nuclear material in the United States and worldwide; rolling back existing nuclear weapons development programs internationally; ensuring the verifiability of nuclear treaties, especially a CTBT; and responding to energy and nonproliferation emergencies.